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Abstract 
The number of free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded by the United States of America (US) has grown vastly over the 
past two decades. While FTAs contribute to increased global competition and as such may also contribute to socially-
undesirable practices in the area of working conditions and the environment, the proliferation in FTAs has paradoxically 
also augmented the potential for making free trade more fair as some of these agreements now include labour provi-
sions. However, the question is whether these trade agreements have also actually diffused internationally recognised 
labour standards. This article studies the FTA the US signed in 2004 with a number of Central American countries and 
which, at a later stage, also included the Dominican Republic.1 This FTA is commonly referred to as CAFTA-DR and in-
cludes a chapter on labour standards. The article argues that the effects of the inclusion of labour standards in CAFTA-
DR have been limited and therefore should be viewed as an unsuccessful attempt at policy transfer. This is illustrated 
by the case of Guatemala, a country known for its lack of respect for labour standards and which is currently the subject 
of a complaints procedure under the CAFTA-DR. It is maintained that this lack of effectiveness is the result of many fac-
tors. Among these is the weakness of the labour chapter of CAFTA-DR resulting from the fact that the chapter is the 
outcome of bargaining processes both within the US and between the US and Guatemala, where symbolic results were 
valued more highly than actual substance. 
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1 The CAFTA-DR countries were Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and, at a later stage, the Dominican Republic. In 
this article I will refer to CAFTA-DR, even in cases where it was technically still limited to the CAFTA countries. 
 
1. The Diffusion of Labour Standards 
Linking labour standards to trade has been the subject 
of much debate since the Second World War. This de-
bate gained momentum in the 1990s. In the context of 
the 75th anniversary of the International Labour Organ-
ization (ILO) in 1994, then Director-General Michel 
Hansenne emphasised the growing social contradic-
tions brought about by intensified globalisation, neces-
sitating more effective international cooperation. In 
particular, Hansenne called for increased implementa-
tion of social rights (Hansenne, 1994). After years of 
discussion within several international settings, it was 
during the World Summit for Social Development in 
Copenhagen in 1995 that core labour standards (CLS) 
were defined as "...including those on the prohibition 
of forced and child labour, the freedom of association, 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the 
principle of non-discrimination” (WSSD, 1995).  
Defining certain rights as fundamental, thereby at-
tempting to increase ratification and ultimately com-
pliance, was also the subject of discussion within the 
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ILO (Kellerson, 1998), and in 1998 the ILO took one of 
its most concrete steps on this when it adopted its Dec-
laration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
The Declaration defines four categories, with associat-
ed conventions, whose principles and rights (although 
not the specific provisions of the conventions) are to 
be upheld by all member states, regardless of whether 
they actually ratified these conventions. These catego-
ries are: the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining (con-
ventions nos. 87, 98); the elimination of forced or 
compulsory labour (conventions nos. 29, 105); the abo-
lition of child labour (conventions nos. 138, 182); and 
the elimination of discrimination in respect of em-
ployment and occupation (conventions nos. 100, 111) 
(ILO, 1998). This Declaration proved to be a major step 
toward limiting the rather complex debate on the large 
number of labour standards to a ‘take-away’ package 
consisting of a set of core labour standards that were 
considered more important than others. This package, 
hereafter referred to as CLS, was subsequently taken 
up (partly or as a whole) by other actors to guide the 
formulation of their own policies, including trade poli-
cies (Van Roozendaal, 2012). In short, a consensus de-
veloped to include certain “rules” in trade agreements, 
and this was also reflected in the US’s bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements.  
Including such standards in trade agreements and 
developing procedures to achieve compliance to such 
standards can be seen as a typical form of policy diffu-
sion through trade instruments. In social sciences the 
transfer and diffusion of policies, institutions2 and alike 
is an important field of study (Busch, Jörgens, & Tews, 
2005; Campbell, 2004; De Deugd & Van Roozendaal, 
2012; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dolowitz & Marsh, 
1996, 2000; Gilardi, 2012). Institutions can be defined 
as “…formal and informal rules, monitoring and en-
forcement mechanisms, and systems of meaning that 
define the context within which individuals, corpora-
tions, labor unions, nation-states, and other organiza-
tions operate and interact with each other” (Campbell, 
2004, p. 1). Studies in this field try to understand how 
institutions, norms, and policies travel from one level 
to another, whether it is on a local, national, transna-
tional or international level. In this way, it adds to dis-
cussions about convergence and divergence of national 
responses to globalization. The mechanisms that ex-
plain policy diffusion can be anywhere in a spectrum 
from voluntary to coercive, although they might not 
always be easy to distinguish and might even be mixed 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Gilardi, 2012). The seminal 
work by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) stresses uncer-
tainty, coercion and the conformity to norms. As this 
                                                          
2 For the purpose of this article, standards are broadly consid-
ered to be a form of institutions, and more specifically a form 
of policy. 
article will show, CAFTA-DR is an illustration of how 
both potentially coercive measures and more voluntary 
measures may be included in order to get countries to 
conform to certain labour standards. Whether the 
use—or the threat of use—of these measures has been 
successful with respect to transferring labour standards 
is one of the questions that needs to be answered. 
Success is defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p. 17) 
as “…the extent to which policy transfer achieves the 
aims set by a government when they engaged in trans-
fer, or is perceived as a success by the key actors in-
volved in the policy area”. Dolowitz and March (2000, 
p. 17) distinguish three reasons for the failure of policy 
transfer: uninformed transfer, which is the result of a 
lack of information about the original circumstances in 
which a policy thrived; incomplete transfer, which in-
volves a situation where key institutional elements for 
success in one country are not transmitted to another; 
and finally inappropriate transfer, which concerns a 
situation where the context is so different that an insti-
tution cannot have the same effects it did in the coun-
try of origin. A fourth reason concerns a situation 
where the sending country is not really interested in 
policy transfer, but is merely interested in the symbolic 
value of it (Campbell, 2004, p. 43). When the aim is on-
ly symbolic, coercive measures will not be used, which 
also adds to symbolic adaptation on the receiving side. 
Nevertheless, as Campbell (2004, p. 43) asserts, such 
symbolic value may eventually lead to a more substan-
tive institutional change as others can use these sym-
bols to put pressure on an actor. 
This article seeks to explore whether there has 
been institutional change in Guatemala, that is to say, 
changes in labour law and practices, as a result of the 
attempt to transfer certain changes by means of a 
trade agreement. In other words, did this attempt lead 
to a convergence of the Guatemalan institutions to-
wards the internationally promoted CLS? As will be il-
lustrated in this article, increasing the political support 
for the trade agreement was a major aim of including 
labour standards in it, but this has only had a limited 
effect. After a brief analysis of the origin of CAFTA’s la-
bour clause and its content, this article will analyse the 
agreement in terms of its content and its actual ef-
fects.3 
                                                          
3 This article is based on an analysis of primary material such as 
reports from governmental and organisational departments, 
on a review of literature, and is informed by several conversa-
tions with experts working in the (research) field. In addition, 
US and Guatemalan news sources were used. The main US 
source concerned Inside U.S. Trade, which was searched online 
from 2003–2014. The Guatemalan news sources Prensalibre, 
La Hora, El Periódico and Agencia Guatemalteca de Noticias 
were searched online from 2000–2014, and articles were re-
trieved concerning CAFTA. 
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2. Labour Standards in CAFTA-DR: What Rules Have 
Been Established? 
In 2001, the US explored the possibilities for what later 
became known as CAFTA-DR. CAFTA-DR’s intention 
was to decrease barriers to trade between the partici-
pating countries and thereby increase trade and in-
vestment. The agreement was further legitimised by 
the argument that it would enhance security in the re-
gion, as it would support fragile democracies and con-
tribute to alleviating poverty and reducing illegal mi-
gration (Ribando, 2005, p. 2). The US promoted CAFTA-
DR as an agreement that would serve to “…not only re-
duce barriers to US trade, but also require important re-
forms of the domestic legal and business environment 
that are key to encouraging business development and 
investment” (US Trade Representative, 2003).4  
Guatemala, one of the members of the proposed 
FTA, is notorious for its lack of respect for labour 
standards. For decades, Guatemalan authorities and 
employers engaged in the violent oppression of trade 
unions and workers. This also occurred under civilian 
governments (Compa & Vogt, 2001, pp. 212-215). The 
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Con-
ventions and Recommendations (CEACR) argued that 
"…for several years it has been noting in its observa-
tions serious acts of violence against trade unionists 
which have gone unpunished…", and it shows that be-
tween 2007 and the beginning of 2011, 52 trade union-
ists were “allegedly” killed, while other trade unionists 
have received death threats, or have in some cases 
been abducted and tortured (CEACR, 2012).5 In numer-
ous observations, the Guatemalan government has 
been asked to prioritise the protection of trade union-
ists and to improve the country's justice system in or-
der to resolve crimes against trade unionists (see for 
example CEACR, 2010, 2011, 2012). The violence 
against trade unionists is also illustrated in reports 
from other institutions, such as Human Rights Watch 
(2011, 2012), despite the optimistic remark in the 2005 
                                                          
4 The interest of Guatemala compared to the US in this agree-
ment was very different. The US is Guatemala’s most im-
portant import and export partner, and since the agreement 
was signed the importance of the US has increased tremen-
dously in terms of value, from 17% of total exports in 2004 to 
42% of total exports in 2012. In terms of imports, Guatemala 
relied on the US for 34% in 2004, and for 38% in 2012. For the 
US, the stakes in Guatemala are lower, as Guatemala is not in 
the top 5 of its export partners, nor of its import partners 
(WTO International Trade and Market Access Data, 2014). In 
2011, it occupied 39th place among US export markets, and 47th 
among its import markets. The largest export product from the 
US to Guatemala is oil, the largest import products are knitted 
apparel, precious stones and fruits and nuts (US Trade Repre-
sentative, n.d.). 
5 CEACR makes often use of the word “alleged”, for example in 
reference to murders.  
Report of the Working Group of the Vice Ministers Re-
sponsible for Trade and Labor in the Countries of Cen-
tral America and the Dominican Republic that “(t)here 
has been a marked decrease in reported violence 
against trade union leaders in 2003 and 2004…" (Re-
port of the Working Group of the Vice Ministers Re-
sponsible for Trade and Labour in the Countries of Cen-
tral America and the Dominican Republic, 2005, p. 41). 
The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
calls Guatemala “(t)he most dangerous country to be a 
trade unionists” (ITUC, 2013, p. 20).  
In addition to the life-threatening dangers to which 
trade unionists are exposed, they are also confronted 
with a situation that makes organisation very difficult. 
Freedom House summarises this as follows: “Roughly 
three-quarters of the workforce is employed in the in-
formal sector, where workers lack standard labor pro-
tections. Anti-union policies include a 25 percent union 
registration requirement for collective bargaining with-
in a company; a stipulation that strikes need to be sup-
ported by 51 percent of the workforce, as well as a 
broad definition of the “essential services” sectors 
within which strikes are barred; and extremely weak 
protections for workers fired for organizing” (Freedom 
House, 2012, p. 8). Between 1954 and 2014, 97 free-
dom of association cases were brought to the attention 
of the ILO on behalf of Guatemalan workers (ILO 
NORMLEX, 2014a).  
Throughout the negotiations of the agreement, la-
bour standards were subject to heated debate in the 
US. This was no surprise, as not only were labour 
standards increasingly linked to the subject of trade, 
but also the issue of violation of labour rights had been 
a constant presence in the US–Guatemalan relation-
ship for some time, starting with the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP) programme. However, the 
multiple complaints that had been filed under the 1984 
labour clause of the GSP to the government of Guate-
mala for not respecting labour standards had never re-
sulted in a suspension of benefits, although some ar-
gue that the pressure itself led to small improvements 
(Douglas, Ferguson, & Klett, 2004, pp. 288-291), while 
others suggest that the threat of sanctions helped to 
restore democracy in 1993 (Compa & Vogt, 2001, pp. 
219-220). That Guatemala was certainly at times sensi-
tive to threats became apparent in 2001, when it was 
already undertaking reforms and the US effectively 
threatened to cut off its beneficial market access if it 
failed to continue to reform its labour law to conform 
to ILO guidelines (Hall & Thorson, 2010, pp. 56-57). 
Just as with the GSP, labour standards were includ-
ed in the CAFTA-DR. Chapter 16, article 1 stipulates 
that “(t)he Parties reaffirm their obligations as mem-
bers of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and 
their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fun-
damental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
Up (1998)….Each party shall strive to ensure that such 
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labor principles and the internationally recognized la-
bor rights set forth in Article 16.8 are recognized and 
protected by its law.” Article 16.2.1(a) conditions that 
“(a) Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor 
laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action 
or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the 
Parties, after the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement”. However, 16.2.1(b) provides opportuni-
ties to deviate from this. Article 16.8 states that “(f)or 
purposes of this Chapter: labor laws means a Party’s 
statutes or regulations, or provisions thereof, that are 
directly related to the following internationally recog-
nized labor rights: 
…a Party’s statutes or regulations, or provisions 
thereof, that are directly related to the follow-
ing internationally recognized labor rights: 
(a) the right of association; 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
compulsory labor; 
(d) a minimum age for the employment of children 
and the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labor; and 
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupa-
tional safety and health.” 
The Chapter furthermore provides for institutional and 
procedural arrangements, and for mechanisms to sup-
port cooperation between the countries involved and 
to facilitate the development of labour standards.  
There are four points to be noted with respect to 
Chapter 16. The first concerns the specific formula-
tions. The emphasis is on “strive to ensure” that the 
above-mentioned labour rights are “recognized and 
protected by its law”. A violation can only be estab-
lished when it is possible to prove that a country has 
not strived, or when there is a violation of its own laws 
that is characterised by “recurring course of action or 
inaction” and related to goods that are traded between 
the partners. When these elements are present, the 
possibility of using sanctions is within reach. While 
these formulations can be considered rather weak and 
may even stimulate countries to further weaken them6, 
they do not prevent action. For example, in May 2013 
the US requested formal consultations with Bahrain 
based on having not strived to ensure the protection of 
labour rights (Letter from Acting United States Trade 
Representative Marantis, Acting United States Secre-
tary of Labor Harris to the Minister of Industry and 
Commerce Fakhro and the Minister of Labour Hu-
maidan of Bahrain). 
                                                          
6 Elliott (2004, p. 6) has suggested that because of the empha-
sis on national laws, countries may decide to not improve 
these national laws. 
A second point involves the nature of the rights. 
The text places the US’s own definition of labour rights 
(called internationally recognised labour rights) above 
the ILO’s CLS, as defined the 1998 ILO Declaration. How-
ever, the two overlap to a great extent. The main differ-
ence between the US Trade Act definition and the ILO 
Declaration is that the latter does not include a refer-
ence to ‘acceptable working conditions’ but does con-
tain a reference to non-discrimination. The US definition 
thus adds the category of acceptable working conditions 
(Article 16.8(e)) but fails to include non-discrimination 
(CAFTA-DR FTA, 2004; US Trade Act, 2002).7  
Thirdly, the Chapter allows for individuals to make 
complaints concerning violations, but does not require 
governments to respond to these complaints in an ef-
fective manner. Article 16.4 of the agreement stipu-
lates that all countries need to have a contact point 
which "…shall provide for the submission, receipt, and 
consideration of communications from persons of a 
Party on matters related to the provisions of this Chap-
ter”. This means that countries not willing to activate a 
specific complaints procedure do not need to and can 
just establish a contact point for communications of 
any sort. However, in the US this provision allows citi-
zens to complain if they believe a country is not ful-
filling its obligations. Subsequently, the US Department 
of Labor’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs will deter-
mine whether to accept the complaints or not (Federal 
Register, 2006).  
Fourthly, another point of importance relates to the 
possibility to use sanctions once a violation of the 
agreement is alleged. This possibility only applies to Ar-
ticle 16.2.1(a), as article 16.6.7 states that “(n)o Party 
may have recourse to dispute settlement under this 
Agreement for any matter arising under any provision 
of this Chapter other than Article 16.2.1(a)”.8 In addi-
tion, the potential punishment is also different. Only in 
such case as a country has failed to enforce its labour 
laws repeatedly regarding trade of goods between the 
parties may a fine be imposed which, according to 
chapter 20 of the same agreement, cannot "…exceed 
15 million US dollars annually”, which is put in a special 
fund to support labour projects. This differs from 
                                                          
7 See for an extensive discussion of developments in FTAs, Van 
Roozendaal and Voogsgeerd (2011). 
8 The limitation as to what part of the agreement the sanction 
applies to is of course of importance. In the case of Bahrain, 
which has a similar FTA with the US, it will secure the country 
from being confronted with sanctions. The US pointed out spe-
cifically in its 2013 request for consultations about violations 
with the country that this will not involve a procedure leading 
to sanctions, as the request is based on another article (Letter 
from Acting United States Trade Representative Marantis and 
Acting United States Secretary of Labor Harris to the Minister 
of Industry and Commerce Fakhro and the Minister of Labour 
Humaidan of Bahrain, 2013).  
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commercial disputes, where no cap is provided (CAFTA-
DR FTA, 2004; Bolle, 2014). 
When the CAFTA agreement was adopted by the 
U.S. Senate 2005, it was accompanied by a promise 
that US$ 40 million would be made available to support 
capacity building in both labour and environmental ar-
eas over four years (Bolle, 2005, p. 6). This amount in-
creased significantly; between 2006 and 2010, US$ 142 
million was spent on technical assistance in the area of 
labour (US Trade Representative, 2011a). 
3. The Labour Chapter in Context 
As demonstrated earlier, the discussion over the link 
between labour standards and trade is part of a debate 
on different views regarding the effects of global liber-
alisation, in which two important viewpoints can be 
distinguished. On the one hand, there is the perspec-
tive that free trade in the long run will lead to econom-
ic improvements for all, and only requires regulation to 
secure this effort. On the other hand, there is the per-
spective that trade should be more regulated in order 
to contain the negative effects for those who are less 
able to defend their interests. The identification of 
such negative effects can range from domestic job 
losses to stimulating unacceptable working conditions. 
Over the last three decades global free trade has 
increased, in terms of value, by an average of about 7% 
annually (WTO, 2013a). The WTO has partly contribut-
ed to this increase in trade to some extent through the 
reduction of tariff barriers under trade agreements 
(WTO, 2013b, pp. 55-56). In 2014, 379 regional trade 
agreements, of which the vast majority are FTAs, were 
in force (WTO, 2014). This process of trade liberalisa-
tion has been characterised by what Bergsten calls 
“competitive liberalisation”, through which countries 
have shown their increased willingness to ease re-
strictions on  trade and often also investment “…to 
compete effectively in international markets, rather 
than simply at home” and "…to compete aggressively 
for the footloose international investment that goes far 
to determine the distribution of global production and 
thus jobs, profits and technology” (Bergsten, 1996). 
Over the past 20 years, this competition has been facil-
itated by bilateral and regional trade agreements 
(WTO, 2014), more than by an international approach. 
The main reason for this is that it is far simpler to strike 
an agreement with a small number of countries than 
with a large number of countries (Bergsten, 1996). This 
approach of competitive liberalisation through bilateral 
agreements gained momentum with the negotiation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1993, and was further enhanced through the negotia-
tion of a number of US FTAs in the mid-2000s (Cooper, 
2011, pp. 7-9).  
In many countries, including the US, the lowering of 
trade barriers has given rise to concerns among the 
public about the negative effects of trade. While a 
2013 poll by Gallup showed that 57% of the Americans 
view trade as a way to increase US exports and there-
fore as a potential for economic growth, this was dif-
ferent in the early 1990s, when most Americans 
viewed trade as a “threat to the economy”. Though the 
general view on trade became more positive between 
1993 and 2005, still more than one-third of the popula-
tion saw it as a threat. From 2005 until 2011, the num-
ber of Americans polled by Gallup viewing trade as a 
threat actually outnumbered those seeing it as a way 
to spur economic growth (Jones, 2013), and in particu-
lar, polls pertaining to NAFTA show that US citizens be-
came increasingly concerned about its effects. Whereas 
in 1991 most Americans were still positive about NAFTA, 
this changed radically in the following years. In 1992, 
33% of the public supported NAFTA and in 1993 only 
31% (Klamer & Meehan, 1999, p. 76). NAFTA polls in 
2008 showed that 53% felt that NAFTA had had negative 
consequences for the US economy in general (English, 
2008). In 2012, a poll showed that only 34% of those 
surveyed believed that NAFTA had provided benefits for 
the US economy (Angus Reid Public Opinion, 2012).  
While polls may not always show consistent results 
and may suffer from methodological problems, politi-
cians are sensitive to them (Shapiro, 2011). And what 
these polls show us is that there is a significant group 
with a negative perception of the effects of free trade. 
Due to the conflict between the different governments’ 
drive to enter into new FTAs, and the negative view of 
voters, trade has become an important subject of de-
bate in US politics. Despite the fact that trade is not the 
most important issue, "…it remains an emotional 
‘wedge issue’ for the electorate, as it has been for the 
last 25 years” (Hurd III, 2012, p. 2). In addition, from 
1995 onwards trade was caught up in the increasingly 
hostile and polarised relationships between Democrats 
and Republicans that was beginning to characterise the 
US political landscape. While both parties include pro 
and anti-free trade politicians, the changing relation-
ship and the increasing importance of social issues re-
lated to trade has severely restricted bipartisan sup-
port for trade (Destler, 2005, pp. 282-290). Destler 
(2005) convincingly shows that the so-called “trade and 
…” issues posed a new challenge to the American trade 
policy which cut right through the bipartisan deals that 
had characterised the trade debate before. With the 
significant decrease in American tariffs during the be-
ginning of the 21st century, social concerns grew under 
the pressure of economic globalisation, with one of the 
central issues being the inclusion of labour clauses in 
US FTAs. During the NAFTA negotiations, President 
Clinton responded to growing concerns in the Demo-
cratic Party about labour (and environmental) stand-
ards in Mexico by adding the North American Agree-
ment on Labor Cooperation to NAFTA, which aided the 
agreement’s adoption. However, trade unions were 
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not satisfied with the NAFTA side agreement on labour. 
With the Democratic Party becoming increasingly fi-
nancially dependent on trade unions, this dissatisfac-
tion translated into strong support for labour issues to 
be included in, for example, fast-track legislation.9 On 
the other hand, among Republicans and the business 
community (who were afraid that references to labour 
might be used to change US domestic laws), the link 
between labour standards and trade was strongly con-
tested. This resulted in 1997 in the failed attempt of 
the Clinton Administration to renew fast track legisla-
tion (Destler, 2005, pp. 253-271). 
In the early 2000s the Bush Administration also 
proposed fast-track legislation. According to Destler 
(2005, pp. 290-302), at this time the strong divisions 
between Republicans and Democrats on the issue had 
softened a bit, with both sides realising their mutual 
dependence: The Bush Administration wanted the 
trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation to support 
fast-track and many Democrats were only willing to 
give the much needed support if issues that mattered 
to them, among which were labour standards, were in-
cluded. To that end, section 2102(6) of the US Trade 
Act of 2002 states that the negotiating objectives of 
the US should be "…to promote respect for worker 
rights and the rights of children consistent with core 
labor standards of the ILO (as defined in section 
2113(6)) and an understanding of the relationship be-
tween trade and worker rights”, and this section in 
turn defines these CLS as "…(A) the right of association; 
(B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a 
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or com-
pulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment 
of children; And (E) acceptable conditions of work with 
respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupa-
tional safety and health.” The new TPA for Bush did not 
mean, however, that trade had become uncontroversial. 
On the contrary, CAFTA-DR encountered much opposi-
tion, with one of the issues being, once again, weak pro-
visions on labour standards (Destler, 2005, p. 304). 
Already from the moment the negotiations were 
announced, the AFL-CIO as well as other interest 
groups had been very critical, and even the US Assis-
tant Trade Representative pointed out in 2003 that 
getting CAFTA-DR approved by the US Congress would 
be a close call (Lobe, 2003). Before the CAFTA-DR 
agreement was concluded, the Labor Advisory Commit-
tee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC) of 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was re-
quested to give its opinion. This committee, consisting 
of 58 labour representatives in 2004, was highly critical 
of the agreement, as illustrated by the following quote: 
                                                          
9 Fast Track or Trade Promotion Authority gives the President 
the opportunity to negotiate trade deals that cannot be 
amended by Congress anymore: they can just be voted up or 
down. 
“The agreement clearly fails to meet some congres-
sional negotiating objectives, and it barely complies 
with others. The agreement repeats many of the mis-
takes of the NAFTA, and is likely to lead to the same 
deteriorating trade balances, lost jobs, and workers’ 
rights violations that NAFTA has created” (LAC, 2004). 
LAC found the agreement’s labour provisions too weak 
to make a difference, and feared that the agreement 
would destroy American jobs. It argued that the provi-
sions in the agreement did not support bringing labour 
laws up to the level of CLS. The LAC maintained that 
the GSP, under which Latin American countries could 
be withheld tariff benefits if they failed to comply with 
standards, was better equipped to improve labour 
standards than CAFTA-DR (LAC, 2004). In fact, the em-
phasis on national labour laws was seen as a major 
step backwards (AFL-CIO, 2005) and trade unions felt 
that the sanctioning mechanism, which treats viola-
tions of the labour chapter differently than commercial 
violations, was not in line with the US Trade Act of 
2002 (LAC, 2004).  
In spite of this criticism, 54 members of the U.S. 
Senate voted in favour of the ratification of CAFTA-DR 
(with just 45 against) in June 2005. The US trade union 
federation AFL-CIO was so dissatisfied with this result 
that it threatened to withhold financial support to 
Democratic candidates for the House who had voted in 
favour of the agreement (Inside US Trade, 2005). This 
threat proved to be unsuccessful, and in July 2005 the 
U.S. House of Representatives approved CAFTA-DR 
with 217 in favour and 215 against.10 
Criticism of CAFTA-DR was not restricted to the US, 
and the agreement was questioned by trade unions 
and other social groups across borders. Trade unions 
and other groups representing workers’ interests out-
side the US agreed on the need for the agreement to 
include a strong reference to labour standards. In Gua-
temala, a group of bishops from the Latin American re-
gion highlighted the lack of public debate on the FTAs11 
                                                          
10 The combination of the limited effect of this threat and the 
importance of the AFL-CIO to the Democrats paint a rather 
conflicting picture of the relationship between the two entities. 
US trade unions are an important supporter of the Democratic 
Party, although they have weakened considerably (Warren, 
2010). Still, in 2008, Obama received almost 60% of the union-
affiliated households’ votes and the unions spent about US$ 
400 million on the 2008 election of Democrats (Hananel, 2012). 
While the AFL-CIO depends on the Democrats to influence pol-
icy, having its wishes granted is less than guaranteed. Heany 
(2012, p. 212) argues that since the 1960, “…labor has received 
fewer dividends from its relationship with the Democrats”. This 
lack of influence can lead to strange collaborations, such as 
that of the AFL-CIO and with the Tea Party to stop Obama’s 
new fast-track authority (Bolton, 2014). 
11 This conclusion is also supported by the fact the Guatemalan 
news sources Prensalibre, La Hora, El Periódico and Agencia 
Guatemalteca de Noticias were searched online and turned up 
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and the lack of provisions in the agreement that would 
allow for investment in social development. According 
to these bishops, CAFTA-DR would confront subsist-
ence farmers with cheap imports from the US. Fur-
thermore, the agreement would not improve labour 
and environmental standards, with job growth taking 
place at the expense of labour conditions (McCarrick, 
Ricard, Imeri, & Chavez, 2004). Trade unions from Gua-
temala shared these concerns. In 2004 and 2005 trade 
unions protested against the agreement. The unions 
feared that it would lead to job losses (El Periódico, 
2005a, 2005b; Hansen-Kuhn, 2005). As with unions in 
the US, Guatemalan unions advocated a labour clause 
in the agreement. In joint declarations from 2002 and 
2003, US and Central American trade unions called for 
an adjusted trade agreement, which would stress the 
adherence to the CLS and a strong dispute settlement 
mechanism (AFL-CIO, n.d.). However, Abrahamson 
(2007, p. 348) argues that Guatemalan social groups did 
not have an opportunity to influence the agreement. 
This shows that the FTA has been subject to dispute 
between the trade unions across the two countries on 
the one hand and the governments in both countries 
involved on the other. However, while the effects of 
CAFTA-DR in general and the labour chapter in particu-
lar have been part of a public discussion in the US, this 
was less the case in Guatemala. In the US, the labour 
provision was a compromise that enabled the passage 
of the agreement. However, while the agreement 
drafted was not received with great enthusiasm among 
the trade unions affected by it, the effects of the la-
bour chapter may have altered this perspective. 
4. The Effects of the Labour Provisions 
As we have seen above, the origins of the CAFTA-DR 
labour clause can be traced back to the US domestic 
political struggle between the Democrats and the Re-
publicans. The inclusion of CLS in all US agreements 
was an attempt to increase support for these agree-
ments. Nevertheless, even an agreement that is per-
ceived to be flawed may still be praised for its unex-
pected positive output. As we have seen, the lack of 
consent of the trade unions with the labour provisions 
was largely due to a lack of faith in the provisions’ ef-
fectiveness. Therefore, it is of importance to under-
stand whether these expectations were realised.  
There are two ways in which the effects of the 
trade agreement and its labour standards chapter can 
be measured. A distinction should be made between 
the effects of the negotiations leading up to the 
agreement (pre-ratification effects) and those of the 
labour provisions specifically in terms of effects on la-
bour law and on labour practices (see also ILO, 2013).  
                                                                                           
only a limited number of articles dealing with this issue. 
4.1. Pre-Ratification Effects 
Before CAFTA-DR was officially on the table, Guatemala 
had already ratified all eight fundamental conventions 
named in the ILO Declaration (ILO NORMLEX, 2014b) 
and around 2003 it was making progress in adapting its 
labour legislation and practices (ILO, 2003, p. 3 [note 
3]; US Department of Labor, US Trade Representative, 
& US Department of State, 2005, pp. 73-97)12. Around 
the time the negotiations were launched in 2003, a 
study conducted by the ILO (at the request of the Cen-
tral American countries) pointed to a number of prob-
lems in the field of labour legislation and labour prac-
tices (ILO, 2003, pp. 18-22).  
However, while recognising that legal revisions 
were much needed in areas to prevent discrimination 
and to establish rules for union election, a 2005 study 
by US Department of Labor, US Trade Representative 
and US Department of State maintained that many 
parts of the conventions related to CLS were “largely in 
conformity” with Guatemalan law (US Department of 
Labor, US Trade Representative, & US Department of 
State, 2005, p. 73). The idea that the problems were 
mainly limited to implementation and enforcement 
and not to the laws themselves became part of a heat-
ed debate between those supporting a strong labour 
chapter and those against, leading to accusations that 
the US Department of Labor had withheld politically 
unwanted reports which had concluded that the labour 
legislation in CAFTA-DR countries actually fell signifi-
cantly short, while the Department claimed that these 
reports were lacking in quality (Inside US Trade, 2003a; 
Margasak, 2005). In 2012, however, the Department of 
Labor recognised the non-existence of recommenda-
tions from the Working Group of the Vice Ministers’ 
2003 report that Guatemala reform its labour law as a 
"…significant omission…" (US Department of Labor, 
2012, p. 18), thereby acknowledging that the legal situ-
ation in at least some areas also demanded attention. 
Although the ILO report had prompted the country 
to make further improvements (Report of the Working 
Group of the Vice Ministers Responsible for Trade and 
Labor in the Countries of Central America and the Do-
minican Republic, 2005, p. 40), actions to strengthen 
inspections or improve labour legislation were not a 
formal condition for the US to get the agreement rati-
fied. In fact, the inclusion of such a condition in FTAs 
only became customary in 2006. Nevertheless, in the 
case of CAFTA-DR, there was an understanding that be-
fore the agreement was signed, the member countries 
would improve their legislation and practices (ILO, 
2013, pp. 36-37). As noted before, that such concerns 
                                                          
12 Labour legislation was adapted in areas related to issues 
raised in the ILO (ILO, 2003, p. 3 [note 3]); and under the GSP 
(US Department of Labor, US Trade Representative, & US De-
partment of State, 2005, p. 75). 
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were brought forward was mainly related to the nega-
tive public stance in general, and of trade unions in 
particular, on free trade. Different representatives 
from the Democratic Party emphasised that the 
agreement would lack enough support to pass if labour 
standards were not included in a meaningful way, that 
is, going beyond the formulation of “enforcing own la-
bour standards” (Inside US Trade, 2003b; Inside US 
Trade, 2003c). In response to this, the US Trade Repre-
sentative promised to not conclude “(n)egotiations on 
labor provisions in the agreement…until the U.S. was 
satisfied that the labor standards in the Central Ameri-
can countries ‘were up to the level that we're satisfied 
with’, and Central Americans make a commitment to 
implement that standard…” (Inside US Trade, 2003d).  
What this level entailed exactly remained unclear. 
On the one hand, this put pressure on the CAFTA-DR 
countries to undertake action, while on the other hand 
it left plenty of room to manoeuvre for the CAFTA-DR 
countries. These countries responded to this “chal-
lenge” by requesting that the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank support an assessment of the situation in 
their countries and come up with proposals to improve 
the situation (Inside US Trade, 2004). The resulting Re-
port of the Working Group of the Vice Ministers Re-
sponsible for Trade and Labor in the Countries of Cen-
tral America and the Dominican Republic (2005) 
optimistically noted that “(s)ignificant progress has 
been made in assuring that the Guatemalan constitu-
tion and labour code contain full protections for the 
fundamental rights of the ILO” (p. 40) and emphasised 
the developments made in the different countries. In 
Guatemala, this ranged from proposals (such as “steps 
taken” to improve labour inspections, proposed budget 
increases for labour ministry) to completed reforms 
such as a decentralisation of courts and the protection 
from exploitative work by children (p. XIII). At the same 
time, it recognised that there was a lot left to be de-
sired. For example, there was a lack of compliance with 
the laws, there remained limitations to the Ministry of 
Labour’s ability impose fines in cases of labour stand-
ards violations, inspectors were politically appointed, 
court decisions were delayed, and there was slow pro-
gress in reforming legislation on gender discrimination 
(Report of the Working Group of the Vice Ministers Re-
sponsible for Trade and Labor in the Countries of Cen-
tral America and the Dominican Republic, 2005, pp. 40-
47). Of interest were the matters that were not men-
tioned. What remained undiscussed in this report were 
legal issues that inhibited the full ability of workers to 
organise themselves (such as requirements for whom 
could be elected or for when union could be estab-
lished) and the high number of (death) threats against 
trade unionists and the general anti-union culture. 
The latter points were rather hard to neglect, and 
were addressed in the 2005 report of the US Depart-
ment of Labor, US Trade Representative and US De-
partment of State, which was drafted to inform the de-
cision-making process on the ratification of CAFTA-DR. 
While the report did mention the lack of protection of 
workers to exercise their rights and the (death) threats 
against trade unionists, it also uncritically established 
that "…the Special Prosecutor's Office has investigated 
141 cases involving trade unionists, 46 of which were 
filed in 2004. The large majority of cases were found to 
be without merit by judges or by the Special Prosecu-
tor's Office"13 (p. 82) and "(i)n June 2004, the Govern-
ment of Guatemala reported positively to the ILO that, 
since 2001, efforts had been made to ensure that labor 
rights were respected in the country as effectively as 
possible, producing a decline in acts of violence against 
trade unionists…No murders of trade unionists related 
to their trade union activity were reported in 2003 or 
2004" (pp. 82-83). While indeed the US Department of 
State's human rights reports for 2003 and 2004 used 
quite neutral language on the work of the Special Pros-
ecutor's Office, the 2009 report started to notice the 
limitations in the office’s capacity to deal with the large 
number of cases. Others argued in 2012 that the prob-
lem was not limited to size, as the Special Prosecutor 
"…refused repeatedly to investigate crimes against trade 
unionists, unilaterally determining, without investiga-
tion, that the individual or family was attacked and/or 
assassinated for non-union activity" (US Leap, n.d.).  
In sum, the CAFTA-DR negotiations did stimulate 
Guatemala to reflect on its development in terms of 
labour standards, and efforts that had already been 
undertaken continued. However, as no specific reforms 
were formulated as a condition to the ratification of 
the agreement in the US, it did not lead to major 
changes. Research by Heintz and Luce (2010, pp. 24-25) 
on the legal requirements and the practices in area of 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
shows some improvement during the years before the 
ratification of the agreement, but only when the 
strength of the changes on certain criteria is weighted. 
All other measurements show no improvement. The 
CIRI database, which reports on changes in labour 
practices in workers’ rights14, did not report an im-
provement between 2003 and 2005 (Cingranelli & 
Richards, 2013a). 
4.2. Effects of the Agreement 
Legal problems exist in Guatemala when labour laws 
are measured against international fundamental labour 
rights, such as in relation to conditions for establishing 
a union or striking. For years, CEACR requested the 
                                                          
13 The full name is the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes 
against Unionists and Journalists. 
14 CIRI uses the American definition, excluding discrimination 
but including minimum working conditions (Cingranelli & Rich-
ards, 2013b, p. 65).  
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amendment of legal provisions, for example with re-
spect to conditions imposed on the establishment of 
industry-wide unions, the requirements for being 
elected as a trade union leader, and limitations on the 
right to strike (CEACR, 2013). However, when reviewing 
the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Hu-
man Rights Practices between 2005 and 2013, no re-
ports of de jure improvements were made. In addition, 
the CIRI database shows that between 2005 and 2011 
the labour standards situation in Guatemala was rated 
at the lowest level and no improvements were made 
that altered that daily practice. According to the US 
Department of Labor (2012, pp. 16-25), in the period 
2005–2010, Guatemala was the only CAFTA-DR country 
that decreased its labour law enforcement budget and 
decreased the number of labour inspectors. This report 
concludes that "(s)ome countries have provided in-
creased resources, training, and infrastructure for their 
inspectorates. Unfortunately, other countries, most 
notably Guatemala, lag behind" (US Department of La-
bor, 2012, p. 25). While the country did establish more 
courts with labour jurisdiction, enforcement of court 
orders was noted as an “ongoing problem”. More posi-
tive developments were noted in terms of “promoting 
a culture of compliance” and in battling the worst 
forms of child labour (such as increasing the compulso-
ry education age) (US Department of Labor, 2012, pp. 
26-35), but the effects of these efforts should not be 
overestimated. For example, effects in terms of child 
labour are unclear from other sources, such as the 
Human Rights Reports of the US Department of State 
(between 2005–2013) and the Reports on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labor of the US Department of Labor 
(between 2005–2011). Only the study by Heintz and 
Luce (2010, pp. 30-33) shows some improvement in ar-
ea of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
when the strength of the changes is weighted.15  
The above shows that the CAFTA-DR did not have a 
strong effect on labour standards practices. It also 
seems that the threat of sanctions has also not made a 
difference thus far. The possible execution of this 
threat became more tangible in 2008, when the AFL-
CIO and six Guatemalan trade unions filed a complaint 
against Guatemala. The core of the complaint is that 
the Guatemalan government seriously and repeatedly 
failed to enforce its own domestic labour laws. All five 
of the individual cases cited in the complaint included 
references to matters also included in ILO conventions 
                                                          
15 There are a few reasons to be cautious about this result and 
the result in the pre-ratification phase, as mentioned earlier. 
The authors employ different kinds of measurements, and the 
vast majority show no improvement in the case of Guatemala. 
At the same time the authors argue (p. 33) that in countries 
with weak labour standards to begin with, this type of meas-
urement may put too much weight on small improvements 
(Heintz & Luce, 2010). 
87 and/or 98, among which was the murder of a repre-
sentative of banana workers. The complaint requested 
the US government invoke the consultation mechanism 
which the FTA foresees, and, if necessary, also the dis-
pute mechanism (AFL-CIO et al., 2008).  
The Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) of the 
US Department of Labor accepted the complaint about 
7 weeks later. The findings of OTLA were not to be 
misunderstood; the Guatemalan Ministry had send out 
inspections to the facilities, but the inspectors were 
simply denied entrance. When courts took over cases, 
the Ministry was not informed about the outcomes, 
and the rulings of the courts were not complied with 
on a regular basis. The report concluded with some 
specific recommendations on how to improve the fail-
ing system and announced that it would look at pro-
gress six months later, but felt at the time that formal 
consultations with Guatemala were unwarranted (OT-
LA, 2009). One of the effects of the complaint was that 
the Guatemalan government sent inspectors to two of 
the factories subject to complaints and anti-union ac-
tivities and workers were ordered to be reinstated, 
which had a long-term effect in only one case (ILO, 
2013, p. 53). According to Vogt (2014, p. 137), such mi-
nor progress actually made it more difficult for the US 
to request consultations, as the Guatemalan govern-
ment was demonstrating good will.  
Just after the OTLA report, excluding the recom-
mendation for formal consultations, was published, the 
Obama Administration came to office, but no immedi-
ate action was undertaken. This changed in 2010, when 
the US filed its first labour rights case ever under an 
FTA, thereby requesting formal consultations (US Trade 
Representative, 2010). That year, important FTAs with 
Panama, Colombia, Peru and Korea were pending and 
the Obama Administration wanted to pass them 
through Congress. Even though, as a result of a 2007 
compromise between the Democrats and the Republi-
cans, these four agreements are equipped with a la-
bour chapter much stronger than the other agree-
ments, some members of the House of Representatives, 
mainly Democrats, were not supportive of these FTAs 
(Cooper, 2010; Liberto, 2011).16 Some therefore argue 
that Obama, pursuing a free trade agenda, filed the 
complaint against Guatemala to show that he is will-
ing—albeit at a slow pace—to follow up on the labour 
aspects of the FTAs, making the Democrats and the 
trade unions more willing to accept the pending trade 
deals (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010). This was 
needed, as Democrats held the majority in both the 
House and the Senate in 2010. 
                                                          
16 As in 2007 Democrats had a majority in US Congress and 
demanded a stronger commitment to labour standards in 
trade agreements, these FTAs contain stronger language on la-
bour standards (Destler, 2007). 
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The official reasons put forward by the US for filing 
this case were the “failures to investigate alleged labor 
law violations”, and the lack of enforcement measures 
being taken once a problem presented itself. Specifical-
ly violence against trade union leaders, freedom of as-
sociation, the right to organise, and collective bargain-
ing are mentioned. The official US government press 
release also mentions that these violations create dis-
advantages for the US (US Trade Representative, 2010). 
The letter written by the US Trade Representative and 
the US Secretary of Labor states that “(t)he United 
States also has grave concerns about the problem of 
labor-related violence in Guatemala, which is serious 
and is apparently deteriorating” and it lays the fault 
with the Guatemalan government, stating that “(t)he 
concerns of the United States include apparent failures 
by the Government of Guatemala to respond ade-
quately to protect those threatened with violence and 
apparent failures to adequately investigate and prose-
cute such crimes” (Letter from US Trade Representa-
tive Kirk and US Secretary of Labor Solis, 2010). 
However, the consultations did not have the de-
sired result. The US government tried to come to an 
agreement, this time through the CAFTA-DR Free Trade 
Commission, but this also had no result as the Guate-
malan government did not agree to changes in the law 
that would allow labour inspectors to impose sanctions 
on employers when in violation of labour law or to 
make employers in the export zones put money in a 
fund to cover the cost of workers’ compensation when 
factories closed (Vogt, 2014, p. 138). A few months lat-
er, the US Trade Representative called for the creation 
of an arbitration panel (US Trade Representative, 
2011b), which was established at the end of 2012, but 
it took until November 2014 for the first submission to 
be filed (Initial Written Submission of the United Sates, 
2014). In the meantime, activities were undertaken to 
settle the conflict. In April 2013, the two governments 
signed an action plan that included detailed steps that 
Guatemala had to undertake in order to correct the 
lack of labour law enforcement. The plan included 
commitments on information exchange between dif-
ferent ministries, the establishment of an electronic 
system to track court decisions, police assistance for 
inspectors when inspecting work sites, resources for 
labour inspectors, the right of labour inspectors to is-
sue fine recommendations and shorten the timeframe 
for handling a case, increasing compliance with labour 
standards in the export sector, and making sure that 
companies would be withheld benefits if they do not 
adhere to labour law (Enforcement Plan, 2013). That 
the commitments were made at all was, according to 
Vogt, probably the result of the fact that the workers’ 
delegation to the ILO had requested the establishment 
of a Commission of Inquiry in order to investigate com-
plaints in the area of Freedom of Association and the 
Right to Organise (Vogt, 2014, pp. 138-139).17  
After having already granted Guatemala in October 
2013 six months to fulfil its commitments (Vogt, 2014, 
p. 139), the Guatemalan government once again got an 
extension of four months from the US at the end of 
April 2014. The Guatemalan trade unions and AFL-CIO 
responded furiously to this. They argued that the Gua-
temalan government shows unwillingness to solve the 
problems by not amending its laws, not enforcing the 
law, and not adhering to major points in the enforce-
ment plan, such as with regard to the frequency and 
role of labour inspectors, non-compliance with court 
orders, sanctioning authorities of the ministry, and so 
forth (letter from AFL-CIO and Guatemalan unions,to 
the US Trade Representative Froman, US Secretary of 
Labor Perez, the Ministro de Trabajo y Previsión Social 
Solorzano and the Ministro de Economia de la Torre, 
2014).18 In September 2014, the US decided that Gua-
temala’s efforts were not substantial enough, and in 
November 2014 the US submitted its concerns to the 
Panel, arguing that Guatemala had not enforced its 
own labour laws and that this had affected trade be-
tween the US and Guatemala in more than 400 cases 
(Initial Written Submission of the United Sates, 2014; 
US Trade Representative, 2014). This shows that, even 
though it took the Obama Administration a long time 
to act upon the labour chapter in the agreement, it 
eventually did proceed with this. Again, other factors 
than the intention to strengthen labour standards may 
have played a role, such as the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (TPP) which is currently being negotiated and is 
viewed critically by the Democrats for the same rea-
sons that the other FTAs were (Committee on Educa-
tion and the Workforce, 2014). 
5. Understanding the Weak Attempt to Forced 
Diffusion of CLS  
This article argues that the effects of the inclusion of 
labour standards in the CAFTA-DR have been—until 
now—insignificant and that this can be understood as 
a case of an attempt at forced diffusion which has 
failed. The weak formulation of the provisions and 
sanction mechanism in the labour chapter, combined 
with the limited action undertaken, suggest that initial 
support for the inclusion of labour standards was main-
ly symbolic. Given the weak language and the lack of 
action that followed, it seems that both countries ac-
cepted the inclusion of labour standards in the FTA 
                                                          
17 In December 2014 no Commission had yet been established 
(ILO, 2014).  
18 Nevertheless, according to a recent ILO study, the complaint 
and its aftermath have made some Guatemalan and US com-
panies anxious for their exports, calling upon the Guatemalan 
government to act and resolve the issue (ILO, 2013, pp. 53). 
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without a clear intention to act upon it. Guatemala was 
not committed to changing its labour laws and, particu-
larly, practices, but the CAFTA-DR agreement forced 
the country to address the issues raised by the agree-
ment. On the basis of the long history of the country 
failing to protect workers, the government’s lack of 
commitment did not come as a surprise. While official-
ly being categorised as a democracy by Polity IV (2014), 
Isaacs (2010, p. 115) argues that in Guatemala 
"…today’s political class has mastered the art of decep-
tion. Politicians may follow democratic practices that 
sometimes yield positive outcomes. Yet they do not 
provide truly representative or responsible govern-
ance”. She paints a grim picture of a country torn apart 
by decades of civil war, which has created a society 
where violence has penetrated everyday life; a weak 
and political legal system which does not defend justice 
but sustains impunity; the takeover of political parties 
by elites, the military and criminals; a left-wing opposi-
tion not strong enough to counter vested interests or 
defend the interests of highly impoverished popula-
tion; and the shimmering hope that this would change 
with the election of Colom in 2007 long gone. The US 
Department of State notes that although Guatemala is 
a multiparty constitutional republic with free and fair 
elections, it is also characterised by "…widespread in-
stitutional corruption, particularly in the police and judi-
cial sectors; police and military involvement in serious 
crimes such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, and extor-
tion; and societal violence, including often lethal vio-
lence, against women” (US Department of State, 2013, 
p. 1). Recent events even indicate a turn for the worse.19 
Under these circumstances, the lack of political in-
centive in the US to actually transfer labour standards 
until recently has not helped to improve the situation. 
As noted, the Bush Administration saw the inclusion of 
a labour clause in CAFTA-DR first and foremost as an 
attempt to make the agreement more acceptable to 
the Democrats and to get it ratified by the US Con-
gress. Because of this, the agreement lacks real teeth, 
with its emphasis on national standards and including 
only a limited fine for the violation of a restricted part 
of the agreement. In short, the institutional change 
framed was one of a symbolic nature, as both the Bush 
Administration as the Guatemalan government were 
forced to deal with the issue of labour standards, but 
were not supportive of it. While on paper the FTA defi-
nitely had some coercive features that would enable it 
to go beyond being symbolic, no measures were taken 
to actually enforce the labour chapter. Only with the 
arrival of the Obama Administration has this symbolic 
                                                          
19 The highly acclaimed Attorney General who been responsi-
ble for the (later overturned) conviction for genocide of former 
President, General Montt, has been forced to resign and has 
been replaced with an Attorney General connected to Montt’s 
political party (Isaacs, 2014).  
nature led to an attempt to change matters more sub-
stantively. It remains to be seen, however, what the ef-
fects of such attempt will be. The question is whether 
the available measures are enough to force an unwill-
ing country to change its institutions and its politics in 
such a fundamental way. 
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